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It is usually accepted that one of the properties of classical logic is monotonicity, which states 
that the validity of implication is not affected by the addition of new premises. In this piece, I 
will argue that this common notion is unjustified since it is motivated by a category mistake. 
The notion of monotonicity is primarily epistemic in character and can’t be meaningfully 
attributed to a system. This is acutely clear in the contrast of monotonicity with non-
monotonicity, which we tend to associate with defeasible inferences, where reasoners can 
abandon a previous inference based on new information. So non-monotonicity is actually the 
reasoners’ willingness to abandon a previous inference based on new information and can 
only be a property of a system in a manner of speaking. It follows that monotonicity should 
be understood in a similar epistemic fashion as the reasoners’ willingness to maintain a 
previous inference after newly discovered information. By analysing the problem from this 
perspective, a classical inference can be considered non-monotonic if the reasoner is willing 
to retract her previous conclusions based on new information. 
Let’s say that in classical logic if a given premise A implies B, then A will still imply B 
given the addition of any other premise C. This property is integral to the notion of 
implication in a classical system. Now, imagine that I assumed that A implied B, but later on 
realised that another proposition, C, is also true, but it is incompatible with the truth of B in 
conjunction with A. In this case, not only would I not accept that the conjunction of A and C 
implies B, as I would withdraw the initial statement that A implies B. This is how things 
should be: if a premise implies a conclusion, then the negation of the conclusion must imply 
the negation of the premise. Otherwise it would not be valid in the first place. The fact that a 
claim to implication can freely incorporate new information is consistent with the 
abandonment of a claim to implication precisely due to the addition of the newly found 
information. 
One way to make this more intuitive is with antecedent strengthening. This inferential 
rule states that A ⊃  B implies (A&C) ⊃  B. This rule also encapsulates the supposed 
monotonicity of classical logic with material implication, but faces apparent counterexamples 
such as the following: ‘If the match is struck it will light. Therefore, if the match is struck and 
it is held under water, it will light.’ This apparent counterexample is also intended to show 
that the inferential rule fails because it doesn’t do justice to the defeasible nature of our 
reasoning in some matters. But this counterexample does not work, since the premise is only 
true when there are normal background conditions that ensure that the match will light when 
stroke, i.e., it is dry, there is the presence of oxygen in the atmosphere, etc. However, the truth 
of one the conjunctives of the conclusion’s antecedent is inconsistent with one these 
conditions, namely, that the match is dry. Thus, in the only context where the premise is true, 
the background conditions necessary for the causal relation are maintained, but in this context 
the conclusion is vacuously true due to the falsity of the antecedent. Or, to put in other words, 
if the conclusion is false, its antecedent is true, but in that case the premise is also false. If I 
find out that the match is also held under the water, I will not conclude that it will light. 
Instead, I will withdraw the initial premise. This is exactly how things should be. 
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This example is also important for a different reason. It is common to assume that a 
material implication is a conditional connective and not a claim to an implication relation. 
This is motivated by the popular notion that to interpret conditionals as claims to implication 
is to commit a use-mention fallacy in which the antecedent and consequent are mentioned as 
the premise and conclusion of an implication relation; whereas genuine conditionals do not 
mention statements, but use them to express a relation between facts and objects in the world. 
This popular view is baseless though. When a conditional is asserted, it’s the whole 
proposition that it is asserted, and not its antecedent and consequent. The assertion of a 
conditional then can be understood as a statement about a relation between the propositions 
expressed by the antecedent and consequent. In other words, the antecedent and consequent 
are mentioned, not used.  
So there is nothing that prevent us from interpreting conditionals as claims to implication. 
The important part is that by interpreting conditional sentences as claims to material 
implications in the example mentioned above we have a clear demonstration of how material 
implication is consistent with reasoners’ non-monotonic dispositions. In an antecedent 
strengthening we accept that if A materially implies B, then A and C materially imply B. If the 
reasoner realises that the last claim to implication is invalid she will abandon the former 
claim as well. This is just a repetition of the same behaviour expressed by formal implication 
in a more restricted range. The reason is that the reasoner can use classical logic in a way that 
is compatible with her disposition to change her mind when confronted with new 
information.   
I believe that classical logic is wrongly perceived as monotonic due to the questionable 
notion that monotonicity can be expressed as a formal relationship between implication 
statements. This erroneous perception is motivated by the excessive importance attributed to 
the formal aspects of valid implication to the detriment of the way flesh and blood people 
may reason using these propositional forms. 
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